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COMMENTS
POST-VACA STANDARDS OF THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION: CONSOLIDATING BARGAINING UNITS
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court announced that since section 2
of the Railway Labor Act' entitled a labor union to be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit for purposes of col-
lective bargaining if designated as such by a majority of the employees in the
unit, it was implicit that there was the duty on the part of the union to repre-
sent all of the employees in the unit fairly and in good faith. 2 Inasmuch as
section 9 of the National Labor Relations Acts contains a similar exclusivity
provision, the duty of fair representation was thereafter imposed upon those
unions certified under that Act.4 In the early decisions involving this
principle, the union's duty was cast in broad, vague terms. The union was
to represent its member employees fairly, impartially, and in good faith,
avoiding hostile discrimination, in both the negotiation and administration
of the collective bargaining agreement.5
In 1967, in Vaca v. Sipes,6 the Supreme Court made its most com-
prehensive pronouncement concerning the nature of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. This Comment will initially focus on the application of the Vaca
standards by the lower federal courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board). The focus will shift for the remainder to ex-
amine the related questions of what special problems a union faces in fulfill-
ing its duty of fair representation in the area of the consolidation of separate
seniority rosters following the merger of two or more bargaining units;
and how a broad reading of Vaca would best protect the interests of the
individual employee without undermining the function of the union as the
representative of its members.
II. Vaca v. Sipes
In order to adequately discuss the Vaca decision, a brief overview of
the facts is first necessary. Owens, a member of Local No. 12 of the National
Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers having a history of high blood
pressure, was employed by Swift & Co. In 1959, he entered the hospital
on sick leave from his employment. After several months' rest, he was
1. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
2. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
4. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953).
5. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) ; Railroad Trainmen's Union v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768,
773 (1952) ; Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944) ; Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
6. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
(885) 1
Mathews: Post-V ACA Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
certified by his family physician as physically able to return to his heavy
work at Swift, but Swift's doctor refused to certify his health for reinstate-
ment. Owens consulted with his union, and a grievance was filed with
Swift on his behalf. After the grievance reached the fourth step of the
five-step grievance procedure established by the collective bargaining agree-
ment, 7 the union decided to send Owens to another doctor, at union expense,
to determine if the evidence was sufficient to succeed at arbitration, the
fifth step in the grievance procedure. Upon receiving an unfavorable report,
the union's executive board voted not to take the grievance to arbitration.
The union advised Owens to accept Swift's offer of referral to a rehabili-
tation center, but Owens insisted on proceeding to arbitration and filed suit
against the union in a Missouri state court, alleging that its refusal to take
his grievance to arbitration was a breach of its duty of fair representation.8
The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.9 The
Supreme Court stated that in order for a union to breach its duty of fair
representation, the union's conduct toward the individual employee must
be "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 10 Applying this standard to
the situation of processing a grievance, the Court indicated that the union
would not be held to have breached its duty for merely having failed to
7. In steps one and two of the grievance procedure, either the aggrieved em-
ployee or the union's representative presented the grievance, first orally to Swift's
department foreman, and then in writing to the division superintendent. In step three,
the grievance committees of the union and management met, the company being re-
quired to state its position in writing. Step four consisted of a meeting between
Swift's general superintendent and representatives of the national union. The fifth
and final step was arbitration. Id. at 175 n.3.
8. Id. at 173-76.
9. A jury returned a verdict for Owens awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, which the trial court set aside on the ground that Owens' complaint stated
an arguable unfair labor practice under section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 386 U.S. at 173. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court of Missouri re-
versed and reinstated the jury verdict. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Mo. 1966).
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court resolved this issue by exempt-
ing cases involving the duty of fair representation from the exclusive jurisdiction of
the NLRB, even though these claims may state meritorious grounds for a finding of
an unfair labor practice. The Court left open the issue of whether the union's breach
of its duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice. However, the Court
stated that, assuming such a breach is an unfair labor practice, the NLRB nevertheless
did not have exclusive jurisdiction where the employee's claim against the union was
tied to a breach of contract action against the employer under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (see note 22 infra). 386
U.S. at 176-88.
It should be pointed out, however, that it would be surprising if the Supreme
Court were ultimately to determine that a breach of the duty of fair representation
does not constitute an unfair labor practice, due to the fact that the NLRB has been
treating it as such for twelve years, ever since its decision in Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 81 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
The issue of the Board's preemption of these claims is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For its treatment in Vaca as well as a general discussion of the pre-
emption doctrine, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 163-74 (1968);
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1435, 1517-23 (1963) ;
Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup.
CT. REV. 81, 85-99 (1967) ; Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction oj the
NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1963).
10. 386 U.S. at 190.
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take a grievance to arbitration, because the employee has no absolute right
to compel his union to take such action.11 Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
mere proof that the grievance was meritorious would not be sufficient to
demonstrate breach of the union's duty.' 2 However, the Court indicated
that a union could not "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a perfunctory fashion, '1 3 and that in weighing the merits of the
grievance, a union must act "in good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner."4
With respect to Owens' grievance, the Court observed that the union dili-
gently supervised the grievance into the fourth step of the grievance pro-
cedure, with the business representative serving as Owens' advocate. Since
Owens presented the union with medical evidence supporting his position,
the Court continued, the union may well have breached its duty had it
ignored the grievance, or processed it in a perfunctory fashion.15 However,
the record disclosed that the union had attempted to gather evidence favor-
able to Owens' grievance through a union-financed physical examination,
and had concluded that arbitration would be futile only after the results
of the examination proved unfavorable. After noting that there was no
evidence to indicate that any union officer had been personally hostile to
Owens, or that the union had acted in other than good faith at any time,
the Court concluded that the union had not breached its duty in this case.' 6
While many of the earlier cases involving a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation were primarily concerned with discrimination born of bad faith
11. Id. at 191. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued for an employee's
right to compel the union to prosecute all "serious" grievances through arbitration.
Id. at 209-10 (Black, J., dissenting). Others have suggested that an employee has
the right to take every grievance to arbitration. See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,
40 N.J. 61, 83-93, 190 A.2d 825, 836-42 (1963); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373, 389 (1965) ; Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362, 399-404
(1962); Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Manage-
ment Agreement, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 188 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Report].
The majority of the Court justified the union's discretion in taking grievances
to arbitration on three grounds. First, the Court observed that this procedure would
weed out frivolous claims prior to a costly arbitration; second, it would assure con-
sistent treatment of similar complaints and perhaps lead to the identification and
resolution of major problem areas in the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement; and third, it would further the interest of the union as the statutory
representative of all the employees in administering the collective agreement. 386
U.S. at 191-92.
12. 386 U.S. at 192-93. The Missouri Supreme Court had determined that the
controlling issue was whether the evidence adduced at trial supported Owens' assertion
that he had been wrongfully discharged by Swift (i.e., his grievance was meritorious),
and that, if it did, the union's refusal to process the grievance through arbitration
was arbitrary and in breach of its duty. Id. at 189-90.
13. Id. at 191.
14. Id. at 194.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 194-95. An ironic note in the circumstances of the case further
justified the decision that the union's failure to proceed to arbitration with Owens'
grievance was based on its good faith doubt as to his physical fitness. Before the case
reached the Court for review, Owens died of hypertension, just as the union's doctor
said he would have, had he returned to work. See Feller, Vaca v. Sipes: One Year
Later, 21ST ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 141, 166 (J. Christensen ed. 1969).
COMMENT
3
Mathews: Post-V ACA Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
or hostility, 17 the Vaca formulation added the term "arbitrary." That this
was not unintended is evidenced by the Court's repeated use of and refer-
ence to the term "arbitrary" throughout the opinion.' 8  In addition, the
use of the disjunctive in "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," implies
that each of the three terms represents a distinct obligation, 19 although the
opinion is devoid of elaboration. In contrast to the subjective notions of
discrimination and bad faith, the term "arbitrary" suggests an objective
standard against which a union's conduct is to be measured. 20 Thus, a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation for failing to take a griev-
ance to arbitration could be premised on a refusal to process the grievance
for no reason, or for an objectively insufficient reason, in addition to bad
faith conduct.
In a lone dissent,21 Mr. Justice Black criticized this addition to the
previously-used bad faith standard. While sympathetic to the plight of the
individual employee, Justice Black felt that the majority's "vague phrase"
was not explained sufficiently to permit jury application. 22 In the seven
17. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) ; Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). Cf. Railroad Trainmen's Union v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768, 773 (1952).
18. 386 U.S. at 183, 190-91, 193-94. Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
held that this repeated usage indicates a calculated expansion of the gamut of pro-
scribed conduct. See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Retana
v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 1972). At least
one commentator seems to concur in this reasoning. See Feller, supra note 16, at 167.
19. Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits view the Vaca test as being one having
three separate standards for measuring the union's duty. Sanderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir.
1972). But see Jones v. TWA, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974).
20. Cf. Lewis, supra note 9, at 107. In discussing the union's handling of Owens'
grievance, the Court stated that a union must assess the merits of each grievance "in
good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner." See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
The use of the conjunctive here suggests that "arbitrary" is an objective standard
against which conduct executed in good faith will be measured.
21. Four Justices joined in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice White. Mr.
Justice Fortas, joined by the two remaining justices, concurred in the result because
he believed that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. 386 U.S. at 198-203 (Fortas,
J., concurring).
22. 386 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black posed a question with
regard to the definition of the standard which has since proved to be an interesting
one: "Must the employee prove that the union in fact acted arbitrarily, or will it be
sufficient to show that the employee's grievance was so meritorious that a reasonable
union would not have refused to carry it to arbitration?" Id.
However, the main thrust of Justice Black's opinion was that an employee such
as Owens should not have been required to prove the incidental claim of breach of the
union's duty of fair representation when he sought direct judicial relief pursuant to a
breach of contract claim against his employer under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (see, e.g., Smith v. Evening News,
371 U.S. 195 (1962)).
Frequently, the employee's unfair representation claim against his union will
be joined with a breach of contract action against the employer for violating the
collective bargaining agreement. The latter claim is normally more valuable to the
employee. For example, if the employee has been wrongfully discharged by the em-
ployer, his main concern will be to obtain reinstatement, a remedy which may be
properly invoked only against the employer. However, before bringing this action,
the employee must initially exhaust the remedies provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). Vaca modified
this procedural obstacle by permitting the employee to demonstrate that his failure to
[VOL. 19
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years since Vaca, Justice Black's concern has been proved valid, not only
by juries, but by the lower courts and the NLRB as well.
III. DiSIONs AFTER Vaca
As the discussion following will indicate, the courts have not been
uniform in their application of Vaca to claims against unions for breaches
of the duty of fair representation. Many still require a showing of bad
faith as a prerequisite to a showing of a breach of the duty while several
regard Vaca as having extended the liability of the union beyond the
extreme instances of bad faith or hostile discrimination. Still others have
read Vaca as subjecting the union to liability in situations where, in the
absence of subjective bad faith, the union's decision to abandon a grievance
was found to be without rational basis, as, for example, where the union
made no effort to investigate the merits of the grievance. Some of these
decisions have also emphasized Vaca's prohibition against a union's "per-
functory" processing of a grievance, a standard which also extends beyond
bad faith conduct. While these courts uniformly recognize that ordinary
negligence alone does not constitute a breach, they nonetheless have found
the union liable for activity which fails to attain proportions of "hostility"
toward the employee.
A. Bad Faith as a Prerequisite for Breach
Several courts have interpreted Vaca as requiring a showing of the
union's bad faith in order to establish a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.2 3 The most stringent standard to which an employee's proof
must adhere is that propounded by the Second Circuit in Cunningham v.
Erie R. R.,24 wherein the court held that in order to establish liability on
utilize the remedies under the contract was due to his union's refusal to process the
grievance through the available procedures. 386 U.S. at 183-86.
Justice Black argued that the employee's burden to establish bad faith or
arbitrary conduct by the union in order to sue the employer was intolerably great:
The Court today opens slightly the courthouse door to an employee's incidental
claim against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation, only to
shut it in his face when he seeks direct judicial relief for his underlying and
more valuable breach-of-contract claim against his employer.
Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting). He proposed an absolute right in the employee
to sue his employer. Id. at 208 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan, concurred in the majority's disposition
of Vlaca, but regarded any discussion of § 301 problems as dicta. Nevertheless,
he intimated that perhaps the employee should be able to sue his employer after
showing that he demanded the union to process his grievance and that it refused to
do so. Id. at 200 (Fortas, J., concurring). For further discussion of this problem, see
Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limitation on the Union Control of
Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1970) ; Lewis, supra note 9, at 93-95;
Wellington, supra note 9, at 178-84.
23. See the cases discussed in Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair Representa-
tion - Steele and its Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280, 283-85 (1971).
24. 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959).
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the part of the union, "[s]omething akin to factual malice is necessary. ' 25
While Cunningham was decided in 1959, the recent decision by the Second
Circuit in Jackson v. TWA, Inc. 26 followed this test,2 7 as did the decision
of the Seventh Circuit in Hiatt v. New York Cent. R.R.2s These two
latter cases involved allegations by groups of employees that their respective
unions had breached their duties of fair representation in agreeing to
specific terms of the collective bargaining agreement.2 9  Perhaps the use
of the "factual malice" test is appropriate in the situation where one or
more employees claim that the union had discriminated against a group of
employees in agreeing to specific terms, as opposed to the instance wherein
an employee asserts that the union has acted arbitrarily toward him or her
individually in refusing to process a grievance. In the former case, the
union rarely can be considered to have acted arbitrarily when it has acted
in the interest of other members of the bargaining unit; the claim can only
be based on discrimination against or malice towards the disgruntled em-
ployees.30 Nevertheless, the phrase, "factual malice," appears to create a
25. Id. at 417. The court apparently meant "hostile discrimination" by its use of
"factual malice": "The duty was no more than to forbear from 'hostile discrimina-
tions.'" Id. In other words, an employee would have to show a specific, antagonistic
animus in order to establish a breach of duty. "The arbitrariness shown must be of
the bad faith kind." Id.
26. 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. Id. at 204.
28. 444 F.2d 1397, 1398 (7th Cir. 1971). Without mentioning Vaca, the court
utilized the term "arbitrariness," but used it in the sense of bad faith amounting to
"factual malice." Id.
29. In Jackson, senior flight engineers sued their union, the Airline Pilots Associa-
tion, for breach of its duty of fair representation in adopting a retirement plan which
allegedly deprived plaintiffs of vested rights. 457 F.2d at 203-04. In Hiatt, the jobs
of the plaintiffs-switchtenders were eliminated by automation. The employees alleged
that the union had breached its duty in agreeing that they should be entitled to take
new positions as brakemen rather than positions in another category. 444 F.2d at 1397.
30. This distinction is suggested in another post-Vaca case in the Second Circuit,
Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970). In that case, the
employer, during the renegotiation of the contract, offered a wage increase for all
employees if the union would agree to withdraw all pending grievances, including the
plaintiffs' claims for back pay and loss of seniority. After a discussion with the plain-
tiffs, the union informed them that their claims were without merit, and thereafter
agreed to withdraw all grievances in return for the wage increase. Id. at 1222-23.
The Second Circuit observed that a bargain which favors one group of employees
over another is not unlawful "if it appears reasonable and if it is made in good faith,"
and included "factual malice" as an element of proof, citing Cunningham. Id. at 1227.
The court concluded that no evidence indicated bad faith by the union and that, since
the union had considered the merits of the grievances, its conclusion that they lacked
merit and its subsequent trading-off of the claims for benefits for all the employees
were reasonable. Id. However, in discussing the union's treatment of the individual
grievances, as opposed to the wage increase agreement with the employer, the court
cited the arbitrariness standard of Vaca, stating that the union would have been liable
had it ignored a grievance or processed it in a perfunctory manner. Id. at 1225-26.
for a brief discussion of trade-off agreements such as that which appeared in Simber-
lund, see note 43 infra.
The distinction between the union's representation of the grievance of a
group of employees and the representation of one employee's grievance is also implicit
in Pirone v. Penn Central Co., 370 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), where one group of
employees alleged that the union had breached its duty to represent them fairly in
formulating a seniority list following the merger of their employer and a second
employer whose employees were members of the same union. Id. at 2411. The court,
citing Vaca and Cunningham, stated that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their
burden of proof because they had not shown "unlawful discrimination." Id. at 2414.
890 [VOL. 19
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more demanding standard than that warranted even by a narrow reading
of Vaca, and thus, as one commentator has observed, "goes too far."'
Other courts have imposed standards which would appear to be less
stringent than the "factual malice" test. Note that all of these cases concern
a claim that the union has not satisfactorily processed a grievance. A
district court in the Sixth Circuit recently held that Vaca required either
a showing of bad faith or proof that the union. official was personally hostile
to the employee.3 2 Similar language appeared in the NLRB's decision in
UAW (North American Rockwell Corp.). 3 3 In Rockwell, two employees
performing similar work filed grievances concerning their rates of pay under
the collective bargaining agreement. One employee's grievance was taken
to arbitration and his claim was upheld. The union failed to take the other
employee's grievance to arbitration, relying on its interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement that the arbitrator was precluded from
considering evidence which arose more than thirty days prior to the filing
of the grievance. The NLRB's General Counsel deemed the union's con-
struction of this provision unreasonable, but the Board held that, even
though it may in fact have been unreasonable, the agreement was given
the same construction in both the grievances in question and there was no
evidence to indicate that the agreement had been construed differently in
the past. The Board continued by noting that while in some cases the
union's conduct may be so patently arbitrary that the union official's
motive need not be shown, no evidence in the case before it disclosed per-
sonal animosity toward thel individual employee, an element which the
Board noted had been present in all its prior decisions on fair representa-
tion.3 4 This requirement of personal hostility by a union official places
a heavy burden of proof on the employee, perhaps as great a burden as the
"factual malice" formulation utilized by the Second and Seventh Circuits.
This test is sufficiently similar to the "factual malice" standard to warrant the con-
clusion that the Second Circuit, at least, believes it is appropriate in cases of group
grievances. See also Freeman v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 85 L.R.R.M. 2806 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
The standard utilized in Pirone apparently conflicts with that applied in
Jones v. TWA, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). In that case, the court applied the
Vaca arbitrariness standard to the union's representation of new union members in
formulating a seniority list following the change of a formerly non-union job category
into one with a union classification. Id. at 798. For a more detailed discussion of
the case, see note 105 infra. These two decisions could be reconciled on any one or all
of three possible grounds. First, Pirone might be read as limiting the "unlawful dis-
crimination" test to the union's role in consolidating seniority lists when members of
the same bargaining unit are involved. Second, Jones may be limited to the special
facts of the case. See note 105 infra. Third, even if the latter case is not limited to
its facts, it may represent a new interpretation of Cunningham, the benefit of which
the Southern District of New York did not have in'.Pirone, as it decided the case
before the Second Circuit handed down Jones.
The fourth section of this Comment presents a more complete discussion of the
union's duty of fair representation in consolidating seniority lists following a merger.
31. Lehmann, supra note 23, at 284.
32. Hines v. Teamsters Local 377, 84 L.R.R.M.,2649, 2651 (N.D. Ohio, Sept.
23, 1973).
33. 194 N.L.R.B. 1085 (1972).
34. Id. at 1087.
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Other courts have held that bad faith is an essential element in claims
for breach of the duty of fair representation.3 5 In Dill v. Greyhound Corp.,
3 6
the Sixth Circuit required a showing of "fraud, misrepresentation, bad
faith, dishonesty of purpose or such gross mistake or inaction as to imply
bad faith."3 7 The Dill court reversed the district court's decision that the
union had breached its duty in failing to take an employee's seniority
grievance to arbitration. Noting that while the district court had made a
finding that the union had acted arbitrarily and in reckless disregard of the
employee's rights, no finding of "hostility, malice or bad faith" was made.3 8
The Ninth Circuit also has applied a bad faith test to union conduct.
In Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Association,3 9 a longshoreman, who
was also an officer of the union local, was "deregistered ' 40 as a longshoreman
for instigating illegal work stoppages. His union local filed suit against
the employer and the international union, alleging that he had been wrong-
fully "deregistered" and that the international union had breached its duty
of fair representation at the arbitration hearing. The thrust of the em-
ployee's complaint was that the provision of the collective agreement relat-
ing to "deregistration" following an illegal work stoppage was not applicable
to union officers. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's granting of
35. See Breish v. Local 771, UAW, 84 L.R.R.M. 2596, 2597-98 (E.D. Mich.,
Oct. 10, 1973) ; Bruen v. Local 492, IUEW, 313 F. Supp. 387, 393 (D.C.N.J. 1969),
aff'd, 425 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1970).
In Breish, an employee was discharged by the company on the grounds that
he had stolen some equipment. The employee alleged that the union failed to seek out
witnesses and evidence to corroborate his story that he had had the company's per-
mission to use the article in question. 84 L.R.RM. at 2597. The court held that the
union had no duty affirmatively to seek out information favorable to the employee,
so long as this failure was not due to dishonesty of purpose. Id. at 2598. Cf. Bazarte
v. United Transp. Union, 305 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1969), vacated, 429 F.2d 868
(3d Cir. 1970). In Bazarte, an employee who had been discharged was given a hear-
ing before the employer, where he was represented by a union official. The district
court found that the union had breached its duty since the union representative had
failed to adequately and fully present the employee's case at the hearing. Moreover,
the representative had failed to bring- all the relevant facts to the attention of the other
union officers who were preparing a defense. 305 F. Supp. at 444. The Third Circuit
reversed, noting that negligence or poor judgment on the part of the union was not
a breach. 429 F.2d at 872. See note 50 and accompanying text in!ra.
At least in cases in which the grievance procedure for discharges culminates
in arbitration, the union's preparation and presentation of a claim should be scrutinized
more closely than most courts have thus far been willing to do, since statistics reveal
that arbitrators overturn the penalty of discharge in the majority of cases. One study
of over 1,000 discharge cases between 1942 and 1956 revealed that the discharge
penalty was revoked by arbitrators in 24 percent, reduced in 34 percent, and sustained
in 41 percent of the cases. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & R. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 657 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLICHTER].
Such findings should also bear upon a court's decision in cases where the union fails
to carry a discharge grievance to arbitration. Professor Lewis argues that the union's
duty of fair representation should be more stringently applied in discharge cases. See
Lewis, supra note 9, at 122-26.
36. 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970).
37. Id. at 238. The court quoted the pre-Vaca decision of Balowski v. UAW,
372 F.2d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 1967).
38. Id. Cf. Morris v. Werner-Continental, 466 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1972), ccrt.
denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973).
39. 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
40. The effect of this "deregistration" was to deprive the employee of any oppor-
tunity of obtaining work as a longshoreman on the Pacific coast. 441 F.2d at 1062-63.
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summary judgment against the local and remanded for trial, finding that
a jury might have inferred from the evidence that certain officers of the
International, motivated in part by hostility toward the employee, sacrificed
his interests in order to obtain a concession from the employer's association
on another dispute involving a larger number of employees. The court was
careful to note that mere proof that the union had "traded off" one dispute
for a concession on another was not a breach, observing that the union
might have chosen, in good faith, between two interpretations of an am-
biguous contract provision.41 Had the union's interpretation of the pro-
vision been patently unreasonable, however, the court noted that this in
itself might support an inference of bad faith.42 Thus, the court refused to
condone a bad faith sacrifice of the rights of one employee in favor of the
interests of a greater number of employees.
43
This analysis by the Ninth Circuit points out one ambiguity in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Vaca. It is clear from Vaca that a breach of
the union's duty of fair representation is not made out solely by proving
that the underlying grievance was meritorious.44 The problem arises, how-
ever, with regard to the question of whether or not a court may delve
into the merits of a grievance as one factdr of the standard against which
the union's conduct can be measured. The Second Circuit reads Vaca as
41. Id. at 1067.
42. Id. at 1067-68 n.10.
43. The court stated:
What we hold is that a union may not agree with an employer, either expressly or
tacitly, to exchange a meritorious grievance of an individual employee for some
other supposed benefit.
Id. at 1068 n.11.
The abandonment of grievances by the union in return for concessions by
the employer presents a complex problem of conflicting interests. See generally J.
KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961); Hanslowe, Individual Rights
in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 45-47 (1959). Professor Cox
recognizes that some trading might be necessary in order to ensure smooth function-
ing of the collective bargaining machinery, but warns that such practices are sus-
ceptible to the extraneous influence of intra-union political pressure. Cox, Individual
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAD. L.J. 850, 854 (1957). For
examples of these various extraneous pressures, see Report, supra note 11, at 153-56.
In the Report, a study was conducted in which questionnaires were sent to labor
lawyers. Of the 175 who responded, over two-thirds stated that, in their experience,
meritorious grievances were "at times" ignored or traded away because of political
pressures within the union. Id. at 156.
Professor Cox would negate the union's ability to surrender a grievance by
an individual which relates to a claim for wages already earned. Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 633 (1956). While his discussion is limited
to grievances concerning wages, the language used by Professor Cox suggests that
the union should be prohibited from compromising any claim by an employee which
has accrued under the collective agreement. The difficulty with such proposals, how-
ever, is that they presuppose that there is but one "correct" interpretation of the
contractual provision in question. In some cases, the provision will be clear and
unambiguous, and thus susceptible to such an analysis. Very often, however, the
provision will lend itself to multiple interpretations, all of which are reasonable. In
fact, Professor Cox himself observes that the terms of a collective agreement often
are intentionally left ambiguous to ensure that the agreement remains sufficiently
flexible to allow future rule-making by the parties under the guise of interpretation.
Id. at 625-26.
44. 386 U.S. at 195.
9
Mathews: Post-V ACA Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
prohibiting a court from considering the merits of a grievance, 45 because
of the following language contained therein:
[I]f a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient merit
to justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation because a judge or jury later found the grievance
meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such grievances short of
arbitration would be seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the
entire grievance procedure of this reduction of the union's freedom
to settle claims in good faith would surely be substantial. . . .There-
fore, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in up-
holding the verdict in this case solely on the ground that the evidence
supported Owens' claim that he had been wrongfully discharged.46
It may be maintained, however, that this language merely restates the
prohibition against the use of proof of a meritorious grievance as the sole
ground for establishing a breach, while allowing such proof as evidence
probative of the fact of the union's good faith. This argument is strengthened
by the Court's observation that the union "may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."'47 Without
the power to determine if the grievance is meritorious, a court would be
unable to utilize this standard. Moreover, the Court argued that the union's
incentive to settle a grievance short of arbitration would be materially
reduced if it could be held in breach of its duty solely by a subsequent
finding by a jury that the grievance had merit. While this may be valid,
a union would not be as inhibited in its dealings if the jury's findings were
only one consideration of many to be weighed as evidence of the union's
conduct. The only effect of such an approach would be to cause the union
to be more circumspect when weighing the merits of an employee's grievance
in order to ensure its good faith, surely a salutary result.
48
45. Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (2d Cir. 1970).
One commentator concurs, observing that Vaca holds a court's consideration of the
merits of the grievance to be reversible error. Kroner, The Individual Employee -
His "Riqhts" in Arbitration After Vaca v. Sipes, 20TH ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR
75, 78 (J. Christensen ed. 1968).
46. 386 U.S. at 192-93.
47. Id. at 191.
48. The Ninth Circuit, in Local 113, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d
1061 (9th Cir. 1971), indicated that the merit of the grievance was an important
consideration in assessing the union's good faith. 441 F.2d at 1067-68, nn.10, 11.
Justice Black, in his dissent in Vaca, read the majority opinion as permitting
an inquiry into the merits of a grievance. 386 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting).
Professor Kroner, while disagreeing with Justice Black's reading of Vaca, nonethe-
less argues that such an inquiry by a court is necessary in order to enforce the
standard adequately, as well as to explain the results in several prior cases. Kroner,
supra note 45, at 79-84. One prior decision by the Supreme Court, not mentioned by
Professor Kroner, included an analysis which suggested that judicial inquiry into the
merits of a grievance was an important consideration in assessing the fairness of
union conduct. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
A related point is the implication in Vaca that if a court determines the
grievance to be without merit, then the union cannot be held in breach of its duty,
since no harm is suffered by the employee. This interpretation is drawn from the
section of the Court's opinion in Vaca concerning the apportionment of damages
between the union and employer when the union is found to have unfairly represented
a grievant. The Court observed that if the company's breach of contract triggered
the controversy (i.e., the grievant's claim was meritorious), the union cannot be held
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The courts that have required the employee to allege and prove personal
hostility or other bad faith conduct on the part of the union have placed
a heavy burden on the employee plaintiff. This is particularly true if the
responsible for those damages which were proximately caused by the company's
breach. 386 U.S. at 195-98. The Court notes that "all or almost all" of the damages
suffered in such cases would be attributable to the employer, irrespective of the
union's conduct in handling the grievance. Id. at 197-98. But see Czosek v. O'Mara,
397 U.S. 25 (1970), where the Court states that, in circumstances the same as those
in Vaca, a union may be responsible for damages which result from its unfair refusal
to process a grievance "to the extent that its refusal to handle the [grievance] added
to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer." Id. at 29.
It might be argued that Vaca's implication that an employee suffers no dam-
age when his union fails to process an unmeritorious grievance is invalid as a
blanket proposition in view of the realities of the collective bargaining process. One
study has shown that 58 per cent of the discharge penalties are either revoked or
reduced when brought to arbitration. SLICHTER, supra note 35, at 657. The implica-
tion is, of course, that the discharged employee has a substantial chance of at least
reducing the penalty if the union proceeds to arbitration. While these figures might
be misleading because many unmeritorious grievances might not have been taken to
arbitration, the fact remains that very often an arbitrator will reduce a discharge
penalty even if the grievance is unmeritorious. Moreover, an employer may concede
to an unmeritorious grievance in return for acquiescence by the union on another
matter or for some other reason which would be in the employer's self interest. See
generally J. KUHN, supra note 43. Consequently, an employee with an unmeritorious
grievance would lose the opportunity to have the arbitrator at least consider his claim
or the employer concede to his demand, if the union fails to press his claim.
While this analysis may be theoretically sound, the practical problem of
fashioning an effective remedy remains a formidable barrier to its utility. For if the
employee was justifiably discharged, reinstatement under court order would be an in-
appropriate remedy, inasmuch as the company was concededly correct in its actions.
Perhaps a monetary damage award against the union might be appropriate, but deter-
mining the amount of loss occasioned by the union's conduct would be highly specu-
lative. The only equitable remedy, from the viewpoint of the union and the company,
would appear to be an order directing the parties to arbitrate the grievance (assum-
ing, of course, that the collective agreement provides for arbitration). While this
remedy is attractive, it is not without its problems. An order to arbitrate is effective
only if it is binding on both the company and the union. Should the court or the
Board be unable to obtain jurisdiction over either the company or the union, an arbi-
tration order would often be rendered ineffectual, as is evidenced by a recent Board
decision. In Local 485, IUE (Automotive Plating Corp.), 170 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968),
an employee filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, alleging that the
union breached its fair representation duty in failing to grieve his discharge by the
company. The Board found for the employee. As it lacked jurisdiction over the com-
pany, however, it could only order the union to "request" the company to consider the
grievance and to arbitrate it should that be necessary. Id. at 1235. The union com-
plied with the Board's order, but the company declined its request to consider the
grievance. The Board then issued a supplemental order which required the union
to be responsible for the employee's lost wages from the date that he requested the
union to grieve his discharge until "such time as the Respondent [union] fulfills its
obligation of fair representation .... " Local 485, IUE (Automotive Plating Corp.),
183 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1970). While this order resolved the arbitration dilemma, it
failed to take into account language in Vaca to the effect that monetary damages in
such cases must be apportioned between the union and the employer. The Second
Circuit pointed this out when it denied enforcement to the Board's order. NLRB v.
Local 485, IUE, 454 F.2d 17, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1972).
Despite these remedial problems, the Board is apparently willing to hold the
union in breach of its duty of fair representation although the grievance is demon-
strated to be meritless. In Teamsters Local 705 (Associated Transport Co.), 209
N.L.R.B. No. 48, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 26,271 (Feb. 28, 1974), the union was held
to have breached its duty when it totally undermined the employee's grievance presenta-
tion before a joint grievance committee. (For a brief discussion of joint grievance
committees, see note 116 infra). The Board, however, agreed with the finding of the
administrative law judge that the employee's underlying grievance was without merit:
thus no affirmative relief was ordered. Id. at 1121. Such a result, while pleasing to
some theoreticians, is of no consolation to the disgruntled employee.
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Second Circuit's interpretation that Vaca prohibits a court from assessing
the merits of the employee's grievance is followed by other courts. If
Vaca is to be thus interpreted as limiting a union's liability to instances of
bad faith or hostile discrimination against employees, then the standard for
the breach of the duty has remained constant since the fair representation
principle was first announced.
49
B. Duty Breached Without a Finding of Bad Faith
In contrast to the decisions holding that either bad faith or hostile
discrimination by the union is a requisite for breach, several courts have
read Vaca as expanding the standard for breach that had previously existed,
and have found the union liable for conduct not rising to the level of bad
faith. At the outset it is important to observe, however, that even these
cases refuse to recognize mere negligence as a breach of the duty.")
In Griffin v. UAW,51 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the repeated
references to "arbitrary" in Vaca reflected a calculated broadening of the
standard of fair representation.5 2 In Griffin, an employee was discharged
by the company for his having engaged in a fist fight with a fellow employee
who was the union officer with whom plant grievances were to be filed.
The court held that, while the union may have acted in good faith, its
requirement that the employee file a grievance with the man involved
in the fight was equivalent to ignoring the grievance or handling it in a
perfunctory manner, thereby violating the "arbitrary" standard of Vaca.5s
The Fourth Circuit's notion of "arbitrary" is indicated by its observation
that "a union must especially avoid capricious and arbitrary behavior in
the handling of a grievance based on a discharge - the industrial equivalent
of capital punishment. 5 4 The term "capricious" indicates that the union
49. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
50. See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Brough v. Steel-
workers Union, 437 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1971) ; Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d
231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d
Cir. 1970); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281,
284 (1st Cir. 1970); Dill v. Wood Shovel & Tool Co., 80 L.R.RM. 2445, 2448 (S.D.
Ohio 1972).
See Hanslowe, supra note 43, at 47-48, where the author discusses the diffi-
culties which would be experienced in establishing equitable standards, should a"negligence" test be adopted.
One observer argues that negligence - particularly gross negligence - should
constitute a breach for which the union should be liable. Tobias, A Plea for the
Wrongful Discharged Employee Abandoned by his Union, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 55,
73-77 (1972). Tobias argues that even if the union cannot be held liable for mere
negligence, the employee should be able to sue the employer for breach of contract
upon a showing that the union negligently failed to press his claim, since "no public
policy is served by allowing the employer to hide behind the union's derelictions of
duty." Id. at 76.
51. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 183. Accord, Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018,
1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 1972). Professor Feller makes a similar observation. See Feller,
supra note 16, at 167-68.
53. 469 F.2d at 184.
54. Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Professor Lewis also would scrutinize more
closely union handling of discharge grievances, See Lewis, supra note 9, at 122-26.
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should be liable when it fails to process a grievance for no rational reason
as well as for a bad faith one.
55
In Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14,56 the Ninth Circuit also
read Vaca's "arbitrary" language as increasing the union's obligations,57 in
contrast to its decision in Pacific Maritime.5 8 The court found that the
complaint brought by several Spanish-speaking employees in a predom-
inately Spanish bargaining unit stated a cause of action for breach of the
duty in that it alleged that the union failed to provide a bilingual liason
between the union and the members; failed to provide the members with a
Spanish translation of the collective bargaining agreement or explain to
them their rights under it; and failed to provide a bilingual supervisory
system to direct them in their jobs. Although these allegations, if proven,
would arguably support a finding of bad faith, the court made it clear that
such a finding was not necessary.59
In DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,"° several
employees complained to their union that they had been discharged in
contravention of the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment had with the company, since they had had greater seniority than some
of the employees who were retained. The agreement provided that seniority
would control the order of discharge, provided the qualifications of the
affected employees were equal. 6'1 The union failed to take the claims
through the grievance procedure, and the employees filed suit. The First
Circuit ruled out the possibility of bad faith, hostility, discrimination, or
dishonesty on the part of the union, but observed that Vaca also condemned
the "arbitrary and perfunctory handling by a union of an apparently meri-
torious grievance. '6 2 The court held that this latter standard had not been
met since the evidence disclosed that only one of the plaintiff's complaints
had been investigated by the union, 3 and that the jury's finding that their
grievances were meritorious was supported by the evidence.6 4 The testi-
mony indicated that the union president had not filed these grievances
because he believed that the propriety of the discharges would be determined
by the Board in connection with a subcontracting dispute, but the court
found that belief unreasonable, since the Board clearly had confined its
inquiry to the complaints of those employees who had been discharged
because of the subcontracting.65 Had there been a reasonable basis for
such a belief, the court noted, the union might not have been found in
55. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
56. 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 1023 n.8.
58. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
59. 453 F.2d at 1024-25.
60. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
61. 425 F.2d at 288 n.8.
62. Id. at 284.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 288-89.
65. Id. at 284.
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breach of its duty.6 Thus, the union was held liable merely for its attorney's
good faith - albeit gross - mistakeY
7
In St. Clair v. Teamsters Local 515,6s the Sixth Circuit arguably
recognized a breach of the union's duty without proof of bad faith, in con-
trast to its decision by another three-judge panel in Dill v. Greyhound
Corp., discussed previously. 9 In St. Clair, an employee was discharged
by the company after failing to report for work.70 Unlike most collective
agreements, this one contained no provisions for arbitration;"1 thus the
only means which the union could employ to obtain the employee's rein-
statement was that of informal oral advocacy; if that failed, the union
could strike. The evidence disclosed that the union's business agent, upon
discovering that the employee's job had been assumed by another worker,
telephoned the company twice in an effort to reinstate the employee. Two
days later the employee received formal notification from the company
regarding his discharge. He then contacted the business agent, who
referred him to the president of the local union. At that time, there was an
election campaign in progress within the local, and the employee was vocally
opposed to the incumbents, including the president. The employee con-
tacted the president, who obtained another job for the employee rather than
pleading his cause with the company. The court held that a union may
violate its duty of fair representation if it ignores or perfunctorily processes
a grievance, noting that the key question was whether the union's conduct
was "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith." 2 The court stated that
the union could have protested more vigorously, threatened to strike, and
even called a strike. As for the strike, the court noted that it was a question
for the jury whether or not a union acted in bad faith by considering the
welfare of many employees in refusing to call a strike in support of one
employee.
78
It is questionable whether Vaca mandates a strike by an entire bar-
gaining unit in support of one employee where there is no provision for
66. Id. at 284 n.4.
67. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text infra. The facts of De Arroyo might
be an example of a situation in which Professor Tobias would argue that relief should
be granted the employee on the basis of gross negligence. See Tobias, supra note 50.
68. 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
69. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
70. The facts on this point were in dispute. The employee alleged that he failed
to report to work due to illness. A company representative told the union's business
agent that the employee was discharged because he failed to report to work, and because
he was an agitator and troublemaker. Several days after his discharge, the employee
received a termination slip from the company stating that he had quit. 422 F.2d
at 129-30.
71. A 1966 study indicated that 95% of the collective bargaining agreements
contained provisions for binding arbitration. See Benewitz, Discharge Arbitration
and the Quantum of Proof, 28 ARB. J. 95 (1973), citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, BULL. No. 1425-26, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBI-
TRATION PROCEDURES 5 (1966).
72. 422 F.2d at 130, quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
73. 422 F.2d at 131. The Eastern District of Michigan in the Sixth Circuit has
recently concluded that as a matter of law the union need not strike in support of one
employee's discharge in order to fulfill its duty of fair representation. Breish v. Local
771, UAW, 84 L.R.R.M. 2597 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 10, 1973).
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abritration, even though his discharge was wrongful, in view of the potential
economic hardship to the majority of employees such a duty would occasion.
Although a union might conceivably put the matter to a vote in the
affected unit and ultimately call a strike should the majority endorse such
action, its failure to advocate or call a strike should not be deemed bad
faith, in the absence of clear proof of hostility toward the wronged employee.
The St. Clair court ultimately remanded the case to the trial court,
noting that it was a question of fact whether the business agent's failure
to contact the company after the employee received his termination slip
was motivated by bad faith. 74 Bad faith in the sense of personal hostility,
as the Sixth Circuit applied in Dill,75 might have been present in St. Clair
due to the employee's political opposition to the president of the local, as
well as the court's statement that "the evidence of bad faith is minimal ....
It can be argued, however, that the tone of the court's discussion of the
union's failure to contact the employer following the employee's receipt of
the notification of discharge supports a finding that the grievance had
been capriciously ignored. "Bad faith" would thus be equated with arbi-
trariness in its objective sense. If such a reading is correct, the Sixth
Circuit's standard for review of the union's duty is unclear.
The NLRB has expressly found a union in breach of its duty under
the "ignoring or perfunctorily processing a grievance" language in Vaca.
In Spectdr Freight System, Inc. 77 the employee had been discharged from
his position as truck driver on the ground that he had reported late for
a driving assignment. The employee filed a grievance with his union, alleg-
ing that the real reason for his discharge was his refusal to accede to
layover practices of the company, which were favored by the union but
which he regarded as illegal under the collective bargaining agreement.
The union processed his grievance through the entire procedure provided
for in the collective agreement, including the two final stages of grievance
committees comprised of union and management representatives, one at
the local level and one at the state level. An agent of the employee's local
union represented him at both these committee hearings, and the state
committee broke the deadlock at the local level by denying the grievance.
The employee then filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, and
a trial examiner found the local union in breach of its duty "[b]y its lack
of candor and by virtue of its misrepresentations of material facts and as
a result of the languid, perfunctory presentation given [the employee's]
grievance"7 8 at the state committee's grievance hearing. While the Board's
74. 422 F.2d at 131.
75. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
76. 422 F.2d at 131.
77. The Board's opinion is unreported. The facts of the case and the Board's
disposition are gleaned from the Second Circuit's opinion in Steinman v. Spector
Freight System, Inc., 441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 601, quoting Trial Examiner's Decision (Mar. 1968). The Board
ordered the union to request the joint committee to rehear the employee's grievance,
stipulating that the employee be represented at the hearing by independent counsel.
Additionally, the union was ordered to reimburse the employee for back wages lost
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rationale is not apparent from the brief excerpt in the Second Circuit's
opinion, its decision did not seem to turn on a finding of bad faith. 9
Apparently, the Board deemed the local's representation to be "languid and
perfunctory" due to the local's failure to apprise the state grievance com-
mittee of certain relevant facts and evidence, including testimony concerning
the employee's opposition to the company's layover policies and the minutes
of the local grievance committee hearing. 0 This is the lone decision by the
Board discovered to date wherein the union has been held liable for per-
functorily processing a grievance."'
In at least one other decision, a union was held liable on a showing of
considerably less than bad faith conduct. In Zalejko v. RCA, s 2 the em-
ployee was on sick leave; the company's doctor pronounced her fit to return
to work, while her own doctor maintained that she was unable. After she
failed to report to work, the company discharged her. The union took
her grievance through four of the five steps in the procedure, the last step
being arbitration. Relying on its attorney's advice that the opinion of the
company doctor was controlling under the bargaining agreement, the union
failed to produce the report by the employee's doctor during its discussions
with the company, and ultimately determined that taking the grievance to
arbitration would be futile. Despite an express finding of an absence of
bad faith, the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld the trial court's
finding that the union's representation was "inadequate," and thus unfair,
as a result of the union's failure to represent him fairly. The union paid the employee
$8,642 in back pay and made the request as ordered, but the committee refused to
reopen the matter, whereupon the employee brought suit against the union and the
employer in federal district court. 441 F.2d at 602.
In the first appeal to the Second Circuit, the court reversed the district court's
summary judgment order in favor of the union and the employer, and remanded the
case. Id. at 604. The court noted that Vaca contemplated a fair hearing on the
merits of the employee's grievance in some forum, and that the Board had determined
in the instant case that the employee had not received one. Id. at 603. The employee,
therefore, was entitled to proceed to the merits of his lawsuit. On remand, the dis-
trict court tried the issue of fair representation without a jury and found for the union.
Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., Civil No. 68-341 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). The
Second Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal, noting that the effect of the Board's
finding that the union had breached its duty was not pressed by the employee either
in the district court or on appeal. Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 476 F.2d
437, 439 (2d Cir. 1973).
79. It is arguable that there was an implied finding of bad faith because the union
had an interest in the failure of the employee's grievance. Since the layover practices
were favored by the union, it is understandable that they did not wish the employee
to succeed in his claim that the real reason he was discharged was that he rejected the
illegal layover practices. Thus, the union's perfunctory handling of the grievance
might have been deemed deliberate by the Board. This conclusion is supported by the
trial examiner's finding that the union made material misrepresentations. See text
accompanying note 78 supra.
80. See 476 F.2d at 439 n.3. For another example of liability imposed upon a
union for perfunctorily processing a grievance, see Bazarte v. United Transp. Union,
305 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1969), vacated, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970).
81. See also Teamsters Local 705 (Associated Transp. Co.), 209 N.L.R.B. No.
48, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 26,271 (Feb. 28, 1974). The union's handling of the griev-
ance in that decision is difficult to categorize.
82. 98 N.J. Super. 76, 236 A.2d 160 (1967).
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since the union attorney was mistaken as to the interpretation of the
agreement.8 3 The union was thus held liable for merely being wrong.8 4
C. Summary
It is apparent from a review of the decisions that "[the] phrase 'fair
representation' is something of a term of art and the standards by which
... [the courts] are bound have not been explicitly set down in a code."85
The Vaca Court undoubtedly framed the standards of the duty in broad,
flexible terms in order to allow the courts and the Board to strike a case-by-
case balance between the interests of the individual employee and the
interests of the union as the reprsentative of the entire bargaining unit.8
It is doubtful however, that the Court contemplated the proliferation of
conflicting standards which followed its opinion. Generally, the courts
have read Vaca narrowly, with the majority of the decisions interpreting
the "arbitrary" standard to mean "bad faith caprice"; if, indeed, they
recognize the standard at all.8 7 In addition, the individual employee's in-
terests are hampered by what Professor Wellington characterizes as a
judicial tendency to attach a heavy presumption of regularity to union
activity.8
As a result, many observers maintain that the present application of
the union's duty of fair representation is insufficient to safeguard the rights
of the injured employee.8 9 In the remainder of this Comment, several pro-
posals by these observers will be examined in the context of the problem
presented by the unions' duty to represent fairly the employees whose
seniority is affected by a merger with a separate bargaining unit.
83. Id. at 84, 236 A.2d at 164. The court made no determination regarding the
reasonableness of the attorney's interpretation of the agreement. Had the interpre-
tation been reasonable, the union arguably fulfilled its duty. See Local 13, ILWU v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061, 1067 n.10 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1016 (1972), and notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Feller, note 16 supra, at 155-56.
85. St. Clair v. Teamsters Local 515, 422 F.2d 128, 130 (6th Cir. 1969).
86. The Court's refusal to set down rigid rules for evaluating the union's con-
duct also allows the courts and the Board to look behind the manifestations of union
decision-making to analyze subjective motivation. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 17
(Colorado Transp. & Storage Co.), 80 L.R.R.M. 1683 (1972).
87. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 73-74.
88. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1341 (1958).
89. See Kroner, supra note 45; Levy, supra note 22, at 1055; Tobias, supra
note 50; Wellington, supra note 9, at 162; Comment, The Implications of Vaca v.
Sipes on Employee Grievance Processing, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 165, 172, 181 (1967) ;
Comment, Union's Duty To Fairly Represent Its Members in Contract Grievance
Procedures - The Impact of Vaca v. Sipes, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 66, 84-85 (1967) ;
Comment, Protection of Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need For
a More Definite Standard of Fair Representation Within The Vaca Doctrine, 14
VILL. L. REV. 484, 496 (1969); Comment, Individual Control Over Personal Griev-
ances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
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IV. FAIR REPRESENTATION AND SENIORITY RIGHTS
FOLLOWING A MERGER
A. Seniority
In its most general sense, seniority is commonly understood to mean
status enjoyed by an employee by virtue of his or her length of service
with the company or within some division of the company.90 Its purpose
is to provide basic job security for employees, in addition to establishing
a yardstick for measuring an employee's right to promotions, job prefer-
ences, and fringe benefits.9' Seniority is often divided into two categories:
One is "benefit" seniority, which concerns such fringe benefits as paid
vacations, retirement pay, and severance pay. This type of seniority usually
depends solely on length of service, and its value is not determined by the
employee's rank on the seniority list. The second type of seniority has
been denoted "competitive-status" seniority, and refers to an employee's
right, vis-i-vis his fellow employees, to preference in regard to such
matters as promotion, lay-off, re-call after lay-off, transfer, and other
employment opportunities. This type of seniority is not determined by the
employee's length of service, but rather by his rank on the seniority list. 2
While length of service is a dominant factor, other variables such as skill,
ability, former position, experience in the industry, and similar criteria,
are often considered. 93 For the purpose of this Comment, the term "seni-
ority" will hereinafter be used in the sense of "competitive-status" seniority,
since the focus will be on the types of rights which that term denotes.
B. The Union's Duty to Represent All Employees Fairly
When Altering Senidrity Rights.
Seniority exists as a matter of "right" only to the extent made so by
the collective bargaining agreement,9 4 surviving only for the life of the
90. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 373 (2d ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as ELKOURI] ; Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforce-
ability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962) ; Industrial Rayon
Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 73, 76 (1955); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 11 Lab. Arb. 139, 141-
42 (1948).
91. See ELKOURI, supra note 96, at 377; Kennedy, Merging Seniority Lists in
LABOR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH
ANNUAL MEEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 2 (1963) ; Industrial
Rayon Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 73, 76 (1955).
92. See generally SLICHTER, supra note 35, at 106; Kennedy, supra note 97, at 2-3.
See also Seniority Roster, Local 640, IATSE, 53 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1258 (1969).
93. See ELKOURI, supra note 96, at 384; Blumrosen, The Worker and Three
Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union
RelationshiP, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1481 (1963).
94. See Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108,
112, 84 N.W.2d 523, 525 (1957) ; Hartley v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201,
206, 277 N.W. 885, 887 (1938).
Even prior to the rise of collective bargaining, employers generally gave job
preferences to employees who had the most years of service, as long as they could
adequately perform the required work. See ELKOURI, supra note 96, at 375, citing
J. LAPP, How TO HANDLE PROBLEMS OF SENIORITY 2-3 (1946).
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collective agreement or until the agreement is amended by the parties." As
the bargaining agent, the union may modify the seniority provisions either
of an existing agreement or from one agreement to another, subject at all
times to its duty to represent all employees fairly. Since any change in
the seniority rules operates more favorably toward certain segments of the
employee unit than others, the union is given a great deal of discretion in
this area, as exemplified by the Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement from
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman :96
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and
classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not
make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented
is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of pur-
pose in the exercise of its discretion.
9 7
The lower courts have traditionally accorded the union this consider-
able discretion in negotiating changes in seniority provisions, and have
usually upheld the resulting arrangements in the face of objections by
disgruntled employees.98 One generally recognized limitation on union
discretion is the prohibition against altering seniority provisions solely to
95. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526
(1949) ; Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 941 (1962); Steelworkers Local 4076 v. Steelworkers Union, 338 F. Supp.
1154, 1161 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
The Second Circuit at one time took the position that seniority was a vested
contractual right which, while subject to bilateral amendment, could not be altered
unilaterally. As a vested right, it was held even to survive the expiration of the col-
lective agreement. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied on this
issue, 368 U.S. 814 (1961). The Zdanok decision was criticized by most legal com-
mentators. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 90, at 550-54; Lowden, Survival of Seniority'
Rights Under Collective Agreements: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 48 VA. L. REV. 291,
298 (1962) ; Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAD. L.J. 907, 911-14
(1962). But see Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 523-24 (1963). Seven years after it was decided,
Zdanok was overruled by the Second Circuit in Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw
Control Co., 405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
96. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
97. Id. at 338. In Huffiman, the Court upheld the union's negotiation of a
provision which granted seniority credits to those employees who were hired subse-
quent to their service in the military, in addition to granting credit to those who were
employed prior to their military duty. The Court noted that seniority was a function
of other factors besides length of employment:
Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs, and similar matters may,
in the first instance, revolve around length of competent service. Variations
acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may well
include differences based upon such matters as the unit within which seniority
is to be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work,
the time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their
family responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor de-
voted to related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary.
Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted). See note 93 and accompanying text supra. Thus,
the Court noted that the provisions were "within reasonable bounds of relevancy"
and were common among other labor agreements. 345 U.S. at 342-43.
98. See, e.g., Fuller v. Teamsters Local 107, 428 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Schick
v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Sweeney v. Hiltebrant, 373 F.2d 491 (6th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Whiting Milk Corp., 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965).
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favor the numerically larger or politically favored segment of the unit.99
In the absence of such blatant bias, however, the problem is one of defining
the standard against which the union's decision-making process is to be
tested. On the one hand is the Vaca standard, narrowly interpreted by a
majority of courts as requiring a showing of bad faith ;100 on the other,
the reasonableness of the resulting seniority provisions as an objective test
of the union's conduct which would follow from a broad reading of Vaca.
Both approaches find support in the language of Huffman.1 1
Professor Blumrosen argues that Huffman stands for the latter propo-
sition - a court has the duty to examine closely the facts of the case and
the arguments proferred by the union in order to protect the expectations
of the employees. 10 2 Professor Wellington takes a similar position with
regard to the protection of the expectations of the employees, even to the
point of advocating that there be a determination that each instance of
union action comports with the "employee-community expectation.'
'10 3
Regarding seniority provisions, he notes that while employees expect that
their seniority rights may be altered, the union should have less freedom
to modify rights acquired in previous agreements than it has to establish
a seniority system in the initial agreement. 10 4 Even Professor Cox, a
staunch advocate of the union's power to bind all the employees it is
charged with representing, recognizes the importance of employee reliance
on established seniority systems:
From a practical standpoint seniority confers a status more important
than a bare contractual undertaking. In practice seniority clauses are
usually carried forward from year to year. Contract and custom
create expectations. Expectations create reliance. It is scarcely an
exaggeration to say that in some industries, notably railroads, em-
ployees build their lives upon seniority preferences in bidding for jobs
99. See, e.g., O'Mara v. Erie Lack. R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd
sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Teamsters Local 568 v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 137, 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ferro v. Railway Express Co., 296 F.2d 847,
851 (2d Cir. 1961); O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 500, 107 N.W.2d
484, 489 (1961).
Another common limitation is the refusal to permit the union to condition
seniority on the length of union membership or the payment of union dues. See
United Steelworkers (Columbia Steel & Shafting Co.), 171 N.L.R.B. 945 (1968);
Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 48 (1966). Contra, NLRB v. Whiting Milk
Corp., 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965).
100. See note 87 and accompaning text supra.
101. The same sentence in Huffman leads to either conclusion. See quote accom-
panying note 97 supra. The Court also devoted a considerable portion of its opinion
to a justification supporting the reasonableness of the union's decision to grant seniority
credits for preemployment military service. 345 U.S. at 339-43.
102. Blumrosen, Union-Management Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. PUBL.
L. 345, 372 (1961). In addition, Professor Blumrosen would negate the authority
of the union to alter existing seniority rights "without adequate justification rooted
in the national labor policy." Blumrosen, supra note 95, at 1477.
103. Wellington, supra note 88, at 1359-61. The term "employee-community
expectation" describes the collective expectations of the bargaining unit as a whole,
which Professor Wellington asserts is a more reliable standard, since a particular
-employee's expectations may be unreasonable. Id. at 1360. He also purports to derive
this standard from the "language and tone" of Huffman. Id. at 1360 n.166.
104. Id. at 1360.
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in a defined pool of work. Under these circumstances it seems highly
formal to reason that since the union and company negotiated the
original seniority clause, they can change it at will. When established
seniority rights are changed, the bargaining representative should be
required to show some practical justification beyond the desire of the
majority to share the job opportunities theretofore enjoyed by a
smaller group.'05
In spite of the view of these commentators, only a few courts have
applied the objective test and inquired into the reasonableness of the
seniority provisions enacted in light of the surrounding circumstances, such
as employee expectations. 10 6 The majority of the courts have refused to
assess the objective merits of the union's decision, and have upset its deter-
minations only when a wrongful motivation has been disclosed.10 7 Because
of the importance of seniority to the individual employee, it is doubtful that
this narrow application of the duty of fair representation is responsive to
his or her interests. It would seem more equitable to place upon the union
the burden to come forward with objective reasons for any adjustment in
the seniority rights of its members. If these rights have not been in
existence through a prior agreement, the union need only offer minimal
proof to overcome its burden. If, on the other hand, the seniority pro-
visions have remained constant through a series of collective agreements,
the union would face a substantial burden in attempting to justify any
105. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 164 (1957)
(citation omitted).
106. See Jones v. TWA, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974); Hardcastle v. Western
Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962);
O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 501, 107 N.W.2d 484, 490 (1961).
In Jones v. TWA, Inc., supra, the employer and the union agreed that a non-
union job category would be re-classified as a union job which in turn was incorporated
into a larger job category. The seniority provision of this larger job category provided
that seniority depended primarily upon when the employee entered a job classification.
Consequently, the former non-union employees who chose to join the union had
lower seniority than those employees already members of the union, because they
were deemed to have entered their present union job classification when they joined
the union, rather than when they actually began work at that job. Id. at 793-95.
The district court held for the union on the grounds that there was no proof
of malice on the part of the union. Id. at 798. The Second Circuit reversed, stating:
[B]ad faith is not universally required to support an employee claim against his
union. Bad faith or hostile discrimination is certainly a sufficient condition to
evidence an irrational decision, but it is not a necessary condition. It is also
sufficient that a distinction be arbitrary or not based on some rational considera-
tion .... The objective of the duty of fair representation is to provide substantive
and procedural safeguards for minority members of the collective bargaining unit.
Id. (citation omitted). Clearly, this language demonstrates the court's willingness to
consider the union's consolidation of seniority from an objective viewpoint, as indicated
by its references to "rational consideration" and "irrational decision."
However, it is possible that the court limited the application of the objective
test to the facts in this case, i.e., the union's change of seniority rights was clearly
discriminatory against non-union members; and the Second Circuit will continue
to require a showing of bad faith in other situations. This view is supported by the
fact that a union is generally held to have violated its duty of fair representation when
the resulting seniority provision is clearly so discriminatory. See note 99 supra.
107. See the cases cited in note 98 supra. 21
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change.1 08 Moreover, since the union in many situations could justifiably
adopt any one of several reasonable approaches to a seniority question,
the adoption of this view would not seriously limit its valid discretion as
the exclusive bargaining agent to any great degree.' 0 9
The difficulties which attend the assessment of the union's duty to
represent all employees fairly when seniority rights of a single bargaining
unit are altered increase when it is necessary to evaluate the union's role
in modifying these rights following the consolidation of seniority rosters of
previously distinct units, which generally occurs following the merger of
two employers. The next section of this Comment will explore this complex
situation.
C. Fair Representation and the Integration of Seniority Lists
Whenever two companies merge," 0 the seniority rights of the two
groups of employees normally must be consolidated into one seniority
system."' In general, two methods of integration are utilized. The first
is "endtailing," whereby all the employees of one company are ranked
below all the employees of the other. 12 In effect, the seniority rights of the
endtailed employees do not survive the consolidation of the work forces,
although, of course, each employee would maintain his relative position
vis-a-vis his former co-workers. The other method is "dovetailing," where-
by the employees of both groups are interwoven on the new seniority
108. This burden would not be an intolerable one, since examples of valid interests
which would dictate changes in the method of seniority computation are numerous.
A common one is granting seniority preference to military veterans. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952). Huffman notes several additional variables
which might properly be considered. See note 97 supra. See also ELKOURI, supra
note 90, at 387-409.
Courts have held that union officials may be entitled to preferential treatment
regarding seniority, in order to facilitate the effective functioning of collective bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521,
527-28 (1949). Speaking for the Court, Justice Frankfurter observed:
Because a labor agreement assumes the proper adjustment of grievances at their
source, the union chairmen play a very important role in the whole process of
collective bargaining. Therefore it is deemed highly desirable that union chair-
men have the authority and skill which are derived from continuity in office. A
provision for the retention of union chairmen beyond the routine requirements
of seniority is not at all uncommon and surely ought not to be deemed arbitrary
or discriminatory.
Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).
109. Cf. Blumrosen, supra note 101, at 372.
110. In addition to a merger situation, the problem of consolidating once separate
seniority lists also exists when one company purchases the assets of another, and the
seller goes out of existence but its employees continue to work for the buyer. The
problem is also presented when one company closes a plant, or a segment of a plant,
and transfers the employees to another seniority unit. The union's duty to represent
the employees fairly applies equally in all these instances, although the final resolution
of the seniority conflict may vary depending upon the nature of the transaction which
caused the consolidation. See notes 132-33 and accompanying text infra.
111. Occasionally, the two groups of employees will retain their respective seniority
rights where, for example, each group performs different work and continues to do so
after the companies have combined. In such instances, the two seniority lists will
remain separate, as though the companies had never combined. See Kennedy, supra
note 91, at 20; Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359, 363 (1964).
112. See, e.g., Lagomarcino-Grupe Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 453 (1964).
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roster so that each employee retains at least some of the seniority he pre-
viously acquired." 3 Regardless of the method of integration, some em-
ployees necessarily will lose some seniority status following a merger. If
a single union represents both groups of employees prior to the merger,
it is faced by the prospect of alienating a certain segment of the employees
no matter what course it adopts.
The leading decision in this area, Humphrey v. Moore,' 14 established
that the union's choice of method of seniority integration must reflect its
duty of fair representation. In Humphrey, two companies were engaged in
the business of transporting automobiles from the assembly plant to dealers.
Due to declining business in a region in which they were competing, one
of the companies agreed to sell its equipment and operating authority in
that area to the other. 115 The employees of both were represented by the
same union local and governed by nearly identical collective agreements
negotiated through multi-employer/multi-local bargaining. Article 4 of
the contracts provided that when one company "absorbed" the business of
another company, the seniority rights of employees "absorbed or affected
thereby" were to be resolved by mutual agreement between the company
and unions involved. Furthermore, Article 7 required that any controversy
which arose regarding seniority rights after an absorption would be sub-
mitted to the joint grievance procedure."" Another subsection of Article 7
provided that all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision
in the contract must be submitted to the contractually created Joint Con-
ference Committee (JCC) for resolution.
113. See, e.g., Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwdg. Co., 396 F.2d 32, 35 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1968).
There are a number of ways in which employees may be dovetailed. For
example, length of employment at either company could be the sole criterion, in
which case the employee with the most years of service would be ranked at the head
of the new list, irrespective of which of the two former companies employed him.
Another method of dovetailing ignores length of service in favor of the employee's
absolute rank within his prior unit, in which case the first man on company A's roster
is followed on the new roster by the number one man on B's list, then A's second man,
and so forth. See generally ELKOURI, supra note 90, at 382-83; Kennedy, supra
note 91, at 12-30; Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359 (1964).
114. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
115. The automobile manufacturer determined that he no longer required two
transportation companies in the area; hence, it announced that it would only grant
operating authority to one of the companies, thereby necessitating the transaction.
Id. at 336.
116. This procedure called for grievances to be discussed by the employer and the
local union and, if not settled, to be submitted to the joint local committee, which was
comprised of equal numbers of company and employee representatives. If no decision
were to be reached at the local committee level, the matter would be taken to the
Joint Conference Committe (JCC), composd of equal numbers of company and union
representatives from the entire multi-partied bargaining group. The decision of the
JCC was final and binding upon the parties involved. If the JCC were to be dead-
locked, the matter would be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 338.
The joint committee is commonly utilized by the Teamsters Union, the union
involved in Humphrey. See, e.g., E. JAMES & R. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS
167-85 (1965) ; Azoff, Joint Committees as an Alternative Form of Arbitration under
the NLRA, 47 TULANE L. Rlv. 325 (1973).
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The president of the local union representing both employee groups
initially determined that no employee of the selling company would carry
over any seniority into the new unit. The seller's employees therefore filed
a grievance, contending that some form of dovetailing was appropriate. The
local joint committee deadlocked, and the matter was referred to the JCC.
The union local decided to recommend that the seniority lists be dovetailed
according to length of service, while the three shop stewards who repre-
sented the employees of the buyer argued for endtailing. The JCC deter-
mined that dovetailing in the manner advanced by the local was most ap-
propriate, basing its decision on the "absorption" provision of Article 4.
Since the employees of the seller generally had more years of service than
those of the buyer, the decision resulted in many layoffs of the latter's
employees.
Consequently, several of the buyer's employees brought a class action
against the union and the company in state court on behalf of all the
buyer's employees, seeking damages and an injunction against imple-
mentation of the JCC's decision. The action was based upon two theories:
(1) the union had breached its duty to represent the buyer's employees
fairly; and (2) the JCC had exceeded its authority under the collec-
tive agreement by taking jurisdiction over the controversy. The trial
court denied the prayer for an injunction,1 7 but the state court of appeals
reversed, holding that even if Article 4 conferred jurisdiction upon the
JCC, the committee's decision could not stand, since the situation involved
antagonistic interests of two employees represented by the same union
advocate.118 In other words, the union breached its duty by espousing a
position favoring one group at the expense of the other.
In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court initially found that the
allegations of the complaint stated a cause of action under §301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) ; therefore, substantive federal
law was controlling. 1 9 In considering the merits of the claim, the Court
reviewed the nature of the transaction between the companies and observed
that the JCC had "reasonably concluded" that an Article 4 "absorption"
had occurred, and that the Committee therefore had properly assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute.120 As for the committee's decision to dovetail
the lists, the Court stated :
The [JCC] was entitled . . . to integrate the seniority lists upon some
rational basis, and its decision to integrate lists upon the basis of
length of service at either company was neither unique nor arbitrary.
117. See 375 U.S. at 341.
118. 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. C.A. 1962).
119. 375 U.S. at 343-44, citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957). See generally Sovern, supra note 9.
This is not to imply that the state court was without jurisdiction in this
matter. The fact that federal labor law is to be applied in section 301 suits does not
remove such suits from the state courts. They must, however, apply federal law. 375
U.S. at 344, citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
120. 375 U.S. at 346.
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On the contrary, it is a familiar and frequently equitable solution to
the inevitably conflicting interests which arise in the wake of a merger
or an absorption such as occurred here. The Joint Conference Com-
mittee's decision to dovetail seniority lists was a decision which
[Article 4] empowered the committee to make.
121
With respect to the issue of unfairness resulting from union representation
of conflicting interests, the Court observed that a union is free to assume
a good faith position contrary to some segments of the employee unit, the
result of an opposite conclusion being a weakening of the processes of
collective bargaining and grievance resolution.122 Since the union, in the
Court's words, had acted "honestly, in good faith and without hostility or
arbitrary discrimination," and based its decision upon "wholly relevant
considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors,"'1 28 it had thereby
fulfilled its duty toward all employees. 124 Finally, the Court answered
the argument that the union's espousal of the rights of the seller's employees
before the committee deprived the buyer's employees of a fair hearing by
121. Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted). At least two commentators argue that
Humphrey's analysis of the committee's substantive decision authorizes a court to
delve into the reasonableness of such committee decisions by examining them against
the language of the collective agreement. Lewis, supra note 9, at 110-14; Van Zile,
The Componential Structure of Labor-Management Contractual Relationships, 43
U. DET. L.J. 321, 334-35 (1966). Professor Lewis argues that this approach un-
necessarily constrains the parties in the resolution of disputes, since ad hoc settlement
during the administration of the agreement, whereby the parties might waive certain
contractual provisions in a particular dispute, would be unacceptable under such a
reading of Humphrey. Lewis, supra note 9, at 113-16.
That such a reading of Humphrey was intended by a majority of the Court
is bolstered by Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, in which he asserted that a
joint committee's decision cannot be attacked by an individual employee in a § 301
suit against the employer since the union and the employer are always free to amend
or modify the agreement during the resolution of a grievance. Nor must the amend-
ment be a formal one, since the parties may interpret an agreement in any mutually
acceptable manner, even if a court could disagree with the interpretation. 375 U.S.
at 352-55 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg's approach would thus
erect separate standards for judicial review of an arbitrator's decision and the decision
of an employer/union committee, since the former must draw its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. See the Steelworkers trilogy: United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav'n Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The Humphrey majority, in contrast, impliedly recognized the similarity
between arbitration and joint committee decisions, subjecting both to the limitations of
the contract. See 375 U.S. at 351, wherein Teamsters Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S.
517 (1963), is cited for the proposition that the joint committee's decision in Humphrey
was binding upon the parties under the terms of the agreement. In Riss, the Court
reviewed a decision by an employer/union committee, subjecting it to the standards
applicable to arbitration awards. See also Feller, supra note 16, at 147.
Despite the arguments that the Humphrey Court's analysis authorizes a
court to view the actions of a joint committee in light of the language of the contract,
it is also possible that any such discussion was limited solely to the question of the
jurisdictional authority of the committee to settle the dispute. Accord, Tully v. Fred
Olson Motor Serv., 37 Wis. 2d 80, 92-94, 154 N.W.2d 289, 294-95 (1967). If such
a reading is accepted, then one must agree with Justice Goldberg that an employee's
sole remedy in a Humphrey situation is a suit against the union on a theory of unfair
representation. 375 U.S. at 358 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
122. 375 U.S. at 349-50.
123. The only "revelant consideration" which the Court emphasized was that
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noting that the buyer's employees were represented before the JCC by three
union stewards, who were given the opportunity to state their position,
yet who made "no request to continue the hearing until they could secure
further representation and have not yet suggested what they could have
added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they had been differently
represented."
125
The Court was analyzing the union's duty toward the employees in
terms of both substantive and procedural fairness. In approving the sub-
stantive position taken by the union, the Court was somewhat vague. It
apparently placed great emphasis on the fact that some employees had to
suffer following the "absorption," and, proceeding from that premise, con-
cluded that therefore dovetailing upon the basis of length of service could
not be termed arbitrary. This objective view of the union's decision to
dovetail was also evidenced in the section of the opinion dealing with
the JCC's contractual authority to settle the dispute. The Court there
noted that the committee was entitled to integrate the seniority lists upon
some "rational basis," and that dovetailing was a familiar method fre-
quently used following a merger or "absorption. '12c This language sug-
gests that the Court was willing to assess the merits of the employees'
grievances in order to evaluate whether the union had met its obligation
of fair representation. 127 Such an approach would be in accord with Pro-
fessor Blumrosen's reading of Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, discussed
previously.' 28 As for the procedural fairness of the union's grievance
presentation, the Court imposed at least two requirements: 1) the em-
ployees in question must receive adequate notice of the joint committee
hearing, and 2) the employees must be afforded the opportunity to state
their position to the committee.129
In view of the critical importance of seniority rights to the individual
employee, the two-pronged Humphrey test - inquiries into the "reason-
ableness" of the union's position and the "procedural fairness" involved -
should be coupled with the requirement that the union prove that its de-
cision was based upon rational, objective factors, as opposed to requiring
the disgruntled employees to prove bad faith or arbitrariness.1 3 0 In the
majority of situations in which seniority lists are consolidated after a merger,
some form of dovetailing is usually appropriate in order to equitably reflect
125. Id. at 350-51. The Court concurred in the trial court's observation that it
would be mere idle speculation to assume that the committee's decision would have
been altered had the grievance been presented differently. Id. at 351.
126. Id. at 347.
127. This language might also support the argument that the Court was engaged
in second-guessing the parties' interpretation (through the JCC) of the collective
bargaining agreement. See note 121 supra.
128. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
129. 375 U.S. at 350.
130. Cf. notes 107-08 and accompanying text supra.
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the contributions each group has made to the new operation.13 ' In situ-
ations where one of the companies is insolvent, endtailing might be appro-
priate.132 Following these general principles, the union should be required
to justify its position regarding the integration of seniority lists by pointing
to such objective factors as the nature of the transaction or the solvency
of the companies involved.
The lower courts have not only refused to place the burden on the
union to come forth with objective criteria in support of its position;
many have also failed even to designate what objective support existed
under the Humphrey "rational basis" test, or to apply the "procedural
131. Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 361,
378 (1955). After reviewing seniority integration practices in several industries,
Professor Kahn observes:
Seniority lists should be integrated when enterprises which are merged have both
contributed "work" to the new consolidated operation, and it is the substance
rather than the legal form of the merger which should determine seniority policy.
Work opportunities should be allocated between the two employee groups in pro-
portion to the contribution made to the joint operation by their respective original
employers. Integregation of seniority lists should ordinarily be accomplished on
the basis of each employee's length of service with his original employer, but
under special circumstances weight may be accorded to "status" by the use of a
ratio or even a rank method.
Id. See Kennedy, supra note 90, at 22-30, for an explanation of Professor Kahn's
"ratio" and "rank" terminology.
See also Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359 (1964), where the arbitrator
applied an interesting method of dovetailing. A company had closed down plant A
and transferred those workers to plant B. The arbitrator regarded the consolidation
at the B plant as a pool of jobs to which each group had made a contribution. Since
the number of A employees who transferred contributed to 41.3% of the total number
of jobs, the B group contributed the balance of 58.7%. Therefore, the A group con-
tributed only 70% (approximately) as much as the B group to the new job pool.
Accordingly, the employees were dovetailed on the list according to length of service
at either plant, but each year of service at the A plant would be deemed the equivalent
of 7/10ths of one year at plant B. Thus, employees who had 20 years of service at
plant A would be ranked equally on the new roster with employees who had served
14 years at plant B.
132. See Cox, supra note 104, at 163. Professor Cox also suggests that endtailing
might be appropriate where one company is much larger than the other, or one com-
pany purchases the assets of the other and the latter becomes liquidated, particularly
where the selling company is in financial trouble, since its employees probably would
have been laid off in any event, had the merger not been effected. Id.
Several Teamsters area agreements prescribe seniority integration in accord-
ance with the legal characterization of the transaction between the companies, i.e.,
if a merger occurs, dovetailing will occur, while if one company acquires the other,
the acquired employees will be endtailed. See, e.g., Morris v. Werner-Continental,
Inc., 466 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973). Other Team-
sters agreements contain provisions similar to those found in Humphrey, whereby
the union locals and the companies involved in an "absorption" or a merger mutually
determine how to effect the seniority integration, with grievances arising therefrom
being submitted to the joint grievance procedure. In the Central States Teamsters
agreements, a special Change of Operations Committe has been organized under the
joint grievance machinery, under whose rules dovetailing occurs when the companies
involved are both solvent, while endtailing occurs when an insolvent carrier is acquired.
Bankruptcy, reorganization, or receivership must be shown in order to evidence in-
solvency. See Mater & Mangum, The Integration of Seniority Lists in Transporta-
tion Mergers, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 343, 363 (1963).
Professor Wellington would require dovetailing whenever seniority lists are
integrated, in order to fulfill the "employee-community expectation," on the theory
that while the employees would expect their seniority to be subject to revision, its
elimination would not be anticipated. Wellington, supra note 92.
COMMENT
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fairness" standard to the union's position.13 3 For example, consider Morris
v. Werner-Continental, Inc.134 In Morris, two companies made an agree-
ment which was characterized as a merger 135 both by the contract between
the companies and by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in
approving the transaction. The collective bargaining agreement provided
that seniority grievances would be determined by a joint grievance com-
mittee whose rules stated that dovetailing would occur in the event of
a merger, while endtailing of the acquired company's employees would
result if there were a "purchase." This committee was initially informed
by the employer that the transaction was a merger, but later was advised
that it was a "purchase." The union locals involved represented both
groups of employees and decided to remain neutral in the dispute. The
joint committee determined that a "purchase" had occurred, which there-
fore mandated endtailing. Several of the endtailed employees filed suit
against the newly formed company, alleging that 1) the ICC's order had
a res judicata effect upon the issue of whether a "merger" had occurred,
and 2) the union had breached its duty of fair representation. 13
The Sixth Circuit quickly disposed of the first contention, noting that
whether the transaction was a "purchase" or a "merger" was not an issue
before the ICC. As for the union's duty of fair representation, the court
observed that since the union, as the representative of both employee
groups, would be in a difficult position, neutrality was probably the most
prudent position to take. Actually, one of the four locals advocated the
plaintiff's position of dovetailing. Perhaps this nonetheless would have satis-
fied the Humphrey procedural requirement that the employees be given an
opportunity to espouse their position before the committee. However, had
the plaintiffs instead favored endtailing, this requirement would not have
been fulfilled, since that group had no advocate before the committee. In any
event, the Sixth Circuit failed to mention this standard of procedural fairness,
other than to assert that the "bargained for arbitration procedure was ade-
quate to provide, and actually did provide, a fair decision .... '137 As for
133. See, e.g., Pekar v. United Brewery Workers Local 181, 311 F.2d 628, 637
(6th Cir. 1962); Pirone v. Penn Central Co., 370 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Freeman v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 85 L.R.R.M. 2806 (S.D. Ga. 1973) ; Turley v. Hall's
Motor Transit Co., 296 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (M.D. Pa. 1969). But see Brown v.
Teamsters Local 355, 292 F. Supp. 125 (D. Md. 1968).
134. 466 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973).
135. The agreement was actually a tax-free reorganization. 466 F.2d at 1188.
136. Id. at 1186.
137. Id. at 1190. For a clear example of a court's failure to apply the Humphrey
procedural fairness test to a joint committee decision, see Ampagoomian v. Johnson
Motor Lines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 262 (D.R.I. 1971) (union's failure to give notice
of the joint committee hearing to involved employees will not render committee's
decision invalid).
As for the substantive propriety of the decision by the joint committee that
a "purchase" had occurred in Morris, the Sixth Circuit observed that it was "extremely
difficult for us to see how the [joint committee] could translate or transform the
merger that actually took place into a purchase," but nevertheless concluded that
this decision could not be overturned in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or a show-
ing of bias or collusion on the part of the committee. Id. at 1190-91. The court
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the Humphrey "rational basis" test, the court simply pointed out that, in
this instance, neutrality was a prudent position for the union to take as
representative of both groups of employees.' 3 8
To date, only the Third Circuit has consistently applied the "procedural
fairness" test of Humphrey. In Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding
Co.,13 9 that court faced a situation resembling the one in Humphrey. Two
companies were engaged in the business of transporting automobiles from
the plant to dealers in the same area of the country. Since both companies
were faced with declining business due to increased shipment by rail, the
manufacturer informed them that only one could continue doing business
profitably. As a result, one company purchased substantially all of the
other's operating equipment, as well as both of its operating terminals. After
the sale, the seller went out of business completely (unlike the selling com-
pany in Humphrey).14O As in Humphrey, both employee groups were
represented by the same local union, and the collective agreements contained
a provision, identical to that in Humphrey, to the effect that following an
"absorption" or a merger, the seniority lists would be integrated by mutual
agreement between the union and employer, and any grievance resulting
therefrom would be submitted to a grievance procedure, which included
joint committee hearings at the higher levels. Following the transaction,
the employees of the seller filed grievances which eventually reached the
joint committee, contending that they should have been dovetailed into the
new unit. At the hearing, the union local officially remained neutral, while
the union stewards and other employees of both buyer and seller argued for
endtailing and dovetailing respectively. The joint committee unanimously
found that there had been no acquisition, purchase, or merger within the
meaning of the contract, and that the acquiring company therefore had no
duty to recognize the seniority requests of the seller's employees. To
forestall endtailing several of the seller's employees brought a class action
against the company and union local, seeking both an injunction against
the implementation of the committee's decision, and a ruling under Section
301 of the LMRA141 that dovetailing was required under the collective
agreement.
42
The Third Circuit initially determined that the record disclosed no
breach of the union's duty of fair representation sufficient to allow a court
either to overturn the committee's decision or to order that dovetailing
be carried out.' 43 It then observed, however, that since the committee's
decision was jurisdictional in nature - it had no jurisdiction since an
further stated that the joint committee would not be restricted to the language of the
collective agreement in reaching its decision. Id. at 1191. This observation is in
line with the sentiments expressed by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in
Humphrey. See note 121 supra.
138. 466 F.2d at 1189-90.
139. 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
140. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Cf. note 15 supra.
142. Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwdg. Co., 231 F. Supp. 910 (D. Del. 1964).
143. 396 F.2d at 37. 29
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absorption or merger had not occurred - a court, following Humphrey,
might properly interpret the contract language to determine if this decision
were reasonable.' 44 After concluding that the committee's decision was in
fact unreasonable, and that the committee should have proceeded under the
"absorption" or merger clause of the contract to resolve the seniority
dispute, the court then examined the actions of the union local in the
controversy.
The court recognized the delicate nature of the union's position as
representative of both groups of employees. Assuming a neutral stance in
the controversy, therefore, did not indicate either bad faith or arbitrary con-
duct.1 45 However, the court observed, the grievance procedure under the
agreement contemplated an adversary proceeding, with both sides pre-
senting their views. The court distinguished Humphrey on the grounds
that in that case neither of the companies involved had gone out of busi-
ness; consequently the management members of the committee, consisting
of members from the buyer and seller, had a substantial chance of being
divided on the seniority question. Thus, the positions of each of the two
employee groups had an equal chance of being adopted regardless of the
union's stance. In Bieski, on the other hand, one company no longer
existed and had no members on the committee. Thus, the remaining com-
pany's representatives would favor endtailing, since dovetailing, under the
circumstances of the case, would increase the total seniority of the new
unit, thereby causing the company to pay out more money in terms of
seniority-based fringe benefits. While the stewards representing both
groups were permitted to espouse their respective views before the com-
mittee, the court observed that the cause of the seller's employees had little
chance of success since, with management aligned against them and the
union neutral, no decision-maker "with any power" would be sympathetic
to their cause.
14
Since the joint committee had erroneously decided that it had no
jurisdiction over the dispute, the court remanded to allow the committee
to reconsider its position and resolve the question on the merits. The court
indicated that should the union continue to espouse dovetailing, as it had
before the court, the proceedings would then be genuinely adversary in
nature, as contemplated by the agreement. If the union decided to revert
to a neutral position, it should make the neutrality "genuine" by either
deadlocking the committee and thereby sending the dispute to arbitration,
144. Id. at 38. See also Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Marine Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061,
1065-66 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
145. 396 F.2d at 39. While it had remained neutral before the joint committee,
the union switched its position and advocated dovetailing before the court. The Third
Circuit theorized that such a change of position may have been an attempt to save
face at the other plants, since the union was aware that joint committee decisions are
rarely overturned by the courts. Id.
146. Id. at 40.
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or, "at the very least," ensuring that the position of the seller's employees
was presented by experienced and competent representatives.
147
The Third Circuit's emphasis in Bieski, therefore, was the adequacy
and fairness of the grievance proceedings in relation to the gravity of the
controversy involved. 148 The court noted that if the proceedings were con-
ducted in a fair manner, it would decline to review the merits of the decision
in the absence of fraud, deceit, or other breach by the union of its duty of fair
representation. 149 While some commentators have criticized the Third Cir-
cuit's involvement with contractual interpretation in Bieski,1 0 its inquiry
into the fairness and adequacy of the joint committee's proceedings seems to
have been clearly sanctioned by Humphrey and is extremely desirable, in
view of the importance of seniority to an individual and his impotence
when opposed by both union and management. Other Third Circuit opinions
have expressed a willingness in that court to test the procedural fairness
of joint committee or arbitration proceedings, although most evidence
satisfaction when the employees' positions were advocated by union shop
stewards, in contrast to Bieski's concern that the employees in some in-
stances need more eloquent advocates. 151
147. 396 F.2d at 42. The court further indicated that the union's neutral position
would be justifiable if new evidence disclosed that the committee's decision that it
lacked jurisdiction had been reasonable. Id. at 42 n.21. The district court's opinion
on remand was not reported. Presumably, since the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision without an opinion, the court was satisfied that the requirements of pro-
cedural fairness had been fulfilled. Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwdg. Co., 497 F.2d 921
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1974) (No. 74-252).
148. 396 F.2d at 38. See also Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.
1968), which involved a pension plan dispute. The Third Circuit again emphasized that
the contractual grievance procedure, also containing provision for a joint committee,
contemplated adversity of interests between union and management. The court
observed that:
[T]he [court] should be satisfied that the quality of the contractual grievance
procedures, in actual practice and "legally," is commensurate with the substan-
tiality of the claim or dispute presented by the employee. If the procedures stiffer
because a union is in breach of its duty of fair representation, clearly the individual
should have recourse to the courts. If an infirmity less than that is present,
federal labor policy would suggest that the rights of a few . . . be carefully
balanced against the concerns of the many ....
Id. at 580 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
149. But see Price v. Teamsters Union, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972) (joint
committee decision will not be overturned unless dishonest, capricious, or beyond
its authority).
The Board has been taking the Bieski approach, or at least a modifica-
of Bieski's approach. Under the doctrine of Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1086
(1955), the Board honors an arbitration award if the arbitration proceedings were
"fair and regular" and the outcome is not repugnant to the purposes or policies of
the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1153. Apparently, the Board will accord
the same respect to awards rendered by joint committees, at least by those set up by
the Teamsters under the National Master Freight Agreement. See, e.g., McLean
Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 82 L.R.R.M. 1652 (1973).
150. See, e.g., Azoff, supra note 116, at 353-57; Note, 55 VA. L. REv. 368 (1969).
Azoff is also critical of Bieski's emphasis on adversity in joint committee decisions,
arguing that this is irrational if the grievance procedure is to act as a means of
achieving industrial harmony. Azoff, supra note 116, at 352. He concedes, however,
that the Third Circuit's concern with the adequacy of the individual's representation
before the joint committee when the union assumes a neutral stance is a realistic
approach, at least in some instances. Id. at 358.
151. See, e.g., Price v. Teamsters Union, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Fuller
v. Teamsters Local 107, 428 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1970).
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With respect to the first prong of the Humphrey standard, the
"reasonableness" of the union's position, the court expressed a willingness
to explore the union's position, as indicated by its suggestions to the
union concerning its conduct during the upcoming joint committee hearing.
Since the court's primary emphasis was on the procedural fairness of the
grievance proceeding, the "reasonableness" of the union's position was of
less importance because all sides of the controversy would be represented.
D. Suggestions for the Future
It must be concluded that the lower courts, with the exception of the
Third Circuit, have been unresponsive to Humphrey's two-pronged inquiry
into the union's position on the resolution of the seniority question. It
would seem, then, that further clarification by the Supreme Court is needed
in this area to assure that the viewpoints of all the employees involved in
such disputes are fully and fairly presented to a joint committee. Moreover,
if the individual employees are guaranteed a greater degree of procedural
fairness - Humphrey's second standard - the reasonableness of the
union's position - Humphrey's first standard - will become less crucial
in these cases. If the joint committee hears both sides of the question, the
position which the union advocates will, of course, be less determinative of
the outcome.
The assurance of a full and fair presentation by both employee groups
before the joint committee would have one further advantage. In contrast
to judicial review of the union's position for reasonableness, a court's review
of the procedural adequacy of such hearings would be neutral in the sense
that it would not be concerning itself with the substantive merits of the
labor questions involved. Thus, procedural safeguards would neither un-
duly hamper the union nor increase external involvement in the parties'
administration of the collective bargaining agreement.
Several observers have expressed the view that the individual em-
ployee should be given a greater role in the arbitration hearing in the
general grievance adjustment mechanism. Since the Supreme Court in
Humphrey subjected the decision of the joint committee to the same
standards of judicial review as an arbitrator's decision,'5 2 the suggestions
by these observers should apply equally to joint committee hearings.
Several commentators have suggested that the employees have the
right to notification and participation in the arbitration hearing, particularly
when the employees are irreconcilably divided on the question involved -
as in a seniority dispute - yet represented by the same union local. 15 3
152. See note 121 supra.
153. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 89; Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and
the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052, 1066-68 (1963); Summers,
supra note 11, at 406-08; Williams, Intervention: Rights and Policies in 16 ANN.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 266, 277-84 (1963). Professor Blumrosen also
advocates individual intervention in arbitration, but would withhold this right until
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Such intervention by individual employees would increase the expense of
arbitration only minimally. 5 4  Should the employees desire an attorney
to represent their interests, it would seem most equitable'5 5 for the em-
ployees to pay for the attorney out of their own pockets.'5 6 Moreover, in
many instances, the employees' interests can be adequately protected, and
their views persuasively advocated, by experienced union stewards, thereby
avoiding the expenses of attorneys, as well as the problem of cost allocation.
These suggestions for requiring participation by the individual em-
ployees in arbitration would neither disrupt the parties' administration of
the collective bargaining agreement nor greatly alter the present scheme
of things. This change, probably best be accomplished by an amendment to
the National Labor Relations Act,157 is a prerequisite to the adequate
protection of individual employee rights in grievance administration.
V. CONCLUSION
The volume of litigation revolving around the union's duty of fair
representation has been startling, and is increasing rapidly. 158 Despite the
doctrine's popularity with aggrieved employees, however, the cases have
demonstrated that an employee's chances of recovering against his union
are slight ;559 the majority of the reported decisions have resulted in either
a dismissal on the pleadings or a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. 160
a court had first determined that the union had breached its duty of fair representa-
tion. See Blumrosen, supra note 102, at 372-74.
Traditionally, the courts have denied the right of the individual employee to
participate in arbitration on general contract principles. The rationale was that since
arbitration is a creature of the contract and the arbitration clause is worded as giving
only the union and the employer the right to demand arbitration, the individual em-
ployee had no standing to demand to participate in the arbitration proceeding. See,
e.g., Acuff v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 147 Conn. 130,
157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960); Mello v. Steelworkers Local 4408,
82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954) ; Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses
Upon the Individual, 9 ARB. J. 3 (1954); Note, 58 MicH. L. REv. 796 (1960).
154. See Summers, supra note 11, at 405; Report, supra note 11, at 184-86.
155. See, e.g., Report, supra note 11, at 184-86.
156. Under Professor Blumrosen's approach, the union might be required to assume
the employees' costs of legal representation in the arbitration or joint committee
hearings, where it had been found in breach of its duty toward those employees by
prior judicial determination. See note 153 supra. Absent such a finding of liability,
however, it would be inequitable to burden the union with the legal expenses of one or
both groups of employees.
157. At least one commentator suggests that legislation is the most appropriate
device for providing individual participation in arbitration. See Lenhoff, supra note 153,
at 25. Professor Williams observes that legislation is inevitable if the parties refuse
to voluntarily allow employee intervention, but regrets the removal of flexibility from
arbitration which governmental intervention would necessitate. See Williams, supra
note 153, at 276.
158. A precise count of the number of cases has not been undertaken. Tobias
asserts that, as of 1972, there had been "several hundred" cases reported after Vaca.
See Tobias, supra note 50, at 67.
159. See, e.g., Lehmann, supra note 28, at 295; Summers, supra note 11, at 410.
160. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 67; Feller, supra note 10, at 152-53.
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This trend is due, in part,161 to the refusal of many courts to read
Vaca as having expanded the scope of the union's duty beyond that of the
prior decisions. More particularly, many of the courts have refused to
uphold the employee's claim where he has demonstrated that the union,
from an objective standpoint, arbitrarily ignored or perfunctorily processed
his grievance. If, as Vaca proclaimed, the fair representation principle is
to stand as a "bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress,1 0 2 the lower courts must utilize a
much more liberal approach to these cases in order to effectuate the spirit
of Vaca. The Supreme Court must also resolve the conflict among the
courts and the Board regarding the relationship between the merits of a
grievance and the union's compliance with its duty.
1 3
A broad reading of Vaca would inure to the benefit of the individual
employee in the context of seniority disputes. The critical importance of
seniority rights to the individual can be meaningfully protected from biased
treatment by the union, in those instances where employees' interests are in
conflict, only by coupling a more liberal reading of Vaca with the approach
of the Third Circuit to the tests of fairness expressed in Hiumphrey.'
M
The main philosophical undercurrent which militates against this approach
is the traditional notion that, in order for the union to deal effectively with
management, the various interests of the individual employees must be
unified into one collective viewpoint, to be defined and controlled by the
union. While it is crucial that the union retain the authority to bargain
with management on behalf of the entire employee unit, there nonetheless
remains a considerable area of issues within which the interest of the
individual employee can be protected without vitiating the collective in-
terests of the bargaining unit.165 Moreover, it is submitted that the union,.
too, has a real interest - self-preservation - in protecting the individual's
rights more jealously: If the individual employee can be assured only that
his interest will be protected from bad faith activity by his union, the value
of his union membership is seriously questioned.
David Mathews
161. Other obstacles confront the employee in his attempt to remedy his injury in
addition to a narrow reading of the union's duty, including: 1) his failure to exhaust
remedies provided for under the collective bargaining agreement, and 2) his failure
to exhaust internal union remedies. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 67.
162. 386 U.S. at 182.
163. See notes 44-48 & 80-87 and accompanying text supra.
164. See Price v. Teamsters Union, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Bieski v. Eastern
Auto. Forwdg. Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
165. See notes 152-57 and accompanying text supra.
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